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Damned if you do (condone pop-
ulism)! Damned if you don’t 
(denounce it loud enough)! Between 
populist slogans and the denuncia-
tions of ‘populism’, it is often hard to 
see which ones are more distressing. 
It is impossible not to be extremely 
worried by the rise of xenophobic, 
nationalist, racist agendas collected by 
political analysts under the vague cat-
egory of ‘populism’. Yet, it is equally 
impossible naïvely to adhere to the 
elitist contempt for ‘the masses’ that 
implicitly fuels the vast majority of 
today’s condemnations of ‘populism’.1 
It is usually in 
the most main-
stream media that 
one hears the most 
sanguine denunciations of populism. 
Political analysts, it seems, enjoy tell-
ing the stupid masses how stupid they 
are, and the stupid masses enjoy being 
told about their collective stupidity (or 
rather their neighbours’). So goes the 
(anti-)populist Punch and Judy show, 
as if it was a structural feature of the 
mass media, rather than a corruption 
of democracy.
If we really want to believe that 
‘the people, united, will never be 
defeated’, however, we better locate 
some intelligence brewing in this col-
lective power. Does this collective 
intelligence merely result from being 
‘united’? Of course, the strength of an 
organized movement is superior to the 
mere sum of its individual parts; but, 
no truly progressive politics can be 
built on the assumption of the stupid-
ity of the individual members of the 
multitude. Rather, as Jacques Rancière 
has stressed for a number of years, it is 
the very trademark of progressive (and 
democratic) politics to hold firm to the 
presupposition of the equality of intel-
ligence among all humans.2 
How can we 
then simultane-
ously claim the 
principle of equal-
ity of intelligence, 
and account for 
the fact that equally intelligent voters 
end up massively subscribing to intel-
lectually disgusting agendas? A first 
intuitive answer suggests a distinc-
tion between populism, conceived as 
a valuable ability to connect with the 
feelings and perceptions experienced 
by (large segments of) the people, and 
demagogy, conceived as a ruthless 
attempt to exploit these feelings and 
perceptions, to hijack them through 
the shrewd art of storytelling, only to 
promote purely self-interested goals. 
If we want to explore this distinction 
a little further, I believe we should 
mobilize an economy of affects and a 
mythocracy of narratives in order to 
carve a representation of the political 
process where both the strength of 
populism and the dangers of dema-
gogy appear under a more empower-
ing light.
 
Affective Importance
 
Whether people march and chant 
together in the streets, or whether 
they nod at the same sentence heard 
on tv (each viewer separately in his 
private apartment), a sociopolitical 
movement is made up of people who 
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1. Exceptions must be 
made, of course, in par-
ticular for Ernesto Laclau’s 
book, On Populist Reason 
(New York: Verso, 2005).
2. Jacques Rancière, The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster: 
Five Lessons in Intellectual 
Emancipation (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 
1991) and Disagreement: 
Politics and Philosophy 
(Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1998).
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move together. The political question 
is: what makes them move together? 
What motivates them to take the 
streets or to stay home, to select 
this demagogue rather than a more 
‘responsible’ candidate in the voting 
booth? This motivation needs to be 
analysed on at least four levels.
The first one is the affective level. 
We move because we are affected by 
impressions coming from the outside 
world and by the tensions they gen-
erate in us, in relation to the needs 
experienced by our bodily and mental 
machine. More than three centuries 
ago, in part III of his Ethics, Spinoza 
attempted to provide a ‘geometrical’ 
account for the dynamics of our affec-
tive reactions, laying the groundwork 
for an ‘economy of affects’ to which 
many thinkers contributed later 
on.3 Since affects 
merely express a 
relation (of ease/
joy, unease/sad-
ness or appetite/
desire) between an 
individual and the 
environment that surrounds and con-
stitutes him, an affect can’t be wrong. 
If you feel hungry, you are hungry. 
It may be bad for your health to eat 
more, you may be wrong in your iden-
tification of what is lacking, but the 
feeling of hunger becomes a reality as 
soon as you experience it. 
Beyond issues of mere survival 
(need for food, water, heat), the affec-
tive level manifests itself through a 
perception of degrees of importance. 
Our affects concern and define what is 
important to us, the things that mat-
ter. Here again, we may be dreadfully 
wrong in identifying what ‘really’ mat-
ters, but we have to cling to the fact 
that something in our given situation 
matters: something we can not or will 
not tolerate, something we can not or 
will not do without. The presupposi-
tion of the equality of intelligence, at 
this basic level, means that we should 
trust people when they feel, say or 
show that something is wrong, or that 
something important is missing. 
Whether it comes in the form of 
analgesic medication, mind-enhancing 
drugs or ‘It doesn’t really matter’ 
statements, the denial of what some 
people actually feel paves the way 
to demagogical recuperations. When 
you tell people they are wrong to feel 
worried about crime, insecurity, losing 
their income, paying more taxes, hear-
ing their neighbour speak foreign lan-
guages or perform strange practices 
– you are wrong: your telling them it 
is not important will not cause them 
to stop feeling that it matters. They 
will go to someone who will (pretend 
to) listen and provide them with this 
most basic form of preliminary agree-
ment (and respect): yes, I hear what 
you feel and I’ll try to respond to it 
(rather than denying your affects). 
Beyond mere politeness or manipula-
tive role-play, such a response needs 
to be anchored in a fundamental pos-
tulate: in most cases, there is a good 
reason why people feel what they feel 
– even if we fail to see it up front, and 
even if we can’t account for it with 
satisfactory explanations.
 
Epidemiocracy
 
A long tradition of political thought, 
where once again Spinoza can be 
claimed as a landmark, characterized 
politics as an interplay of affects. Only 
dreamers, we can read at the begin-
ning of the Tractatus Politicus (1677), 
believe politics to be a matter of 
rational calculation about a nation’s 
best interests: we humans, in most of 
our daily moves, cannot help but react 
affectively along the coincidental asso-
ciations traced by our imagination. 
While it is supremely valuable to act 
on the basis of rational understanding 
(intellectus) when we manage to mas-
ter causal explanations (which should 
be our highest goal), we are all neces-
sarily tossed around by the coinciden-
tal associations of our imagination.
More importantly, this tossing 
around cannot be understood as an 
individual phenomenon, but needs 
to be understood along collective 
lines. The ‘imitation of affects’ (imi-
tatio affectuum) is the most preva-
lent mechanism Spinoza referred to 
when he attempted to geometrize our 
emotional-social life – paving the way 
for John Stuart Mill’s complaint that 
‘people like (things) in crowds’, for 
Gabriel Tarde’s Laws of imitation and 
for René Girard’s ‘mimetic desire’. 
Apart from extremely basic needs 
(hunger, thirst, etc.), my affects are 
never merely my affects, but always 
ours. My spouse’s sadness makes me 
sad; seeing my neighbour afraid is 
likely to foster my fears. 
We therefore need to study a sec-
ond layer of motivations, an epidemic 
level, where each of us is moved by a 
variety of collective movements. This 
variety often pushes us in contradic-
tory directions, but they always push 
us ‘in numbers’. ‘Populist’ and ‘non-
populist’ politics alike (whatever the 
latter might mean!) are fuelled by such 
contagions, structuring all democra-
cies as epidemiocracies. 
At this second level, it would be 
possible to make somewhat stronger 
claims to show that one could be 
‘wrong’ to feel what one feels. Insofar 
as our individual lives follow their iso-
lated course, I am likely to be misled 
by my neighbour’s fears: his allergy 
towards being stung by a bee certainly 
matters to him, but my adopting his 
fears causes me unnecessary stress. 
Yet, in our increasingly interdepend-
ent and interwoven world, I am just 
as likely to be affected by what affects 
my neighbour, my contemporaries, 
my fellow-humans. At these two basic 
levels, therefore, if ‘populism’ refers 
to a capacity to connect with people’s 
affects, to hear them, to listen to them, 
and to provide a response that is per-
ceived as relevant to the importance 
of the matter, then we should try our 
best to be as populist as possible. 
Tyrants, kings, exploiters can show 
contempt for epidemiocratic affects 
– at their own risks! Self-proclaimed 
democrats can’t, and shouldn’t.
 
Narrative Structures
 
Affects, in themselves, appear as 
unbound energy. Desire may push me 
towards an object, fear may pull me 
away from it. But apart from the most 
3. For more on this, see 
Yves Citton and Frédéric 
Lordon, Spinoza et les 
sciences sociales. De la 
puissance de la multitude 
à l’économie politique 
des affects (Paris: Édi-
tions Amsterdam, 2008/
republished in paperback 
in 2010).
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simple examples (reflex, instinct), 
affects only become effective – in 
pushing us in this or that direction 
– when they are integrated into a nar-
rative structure. Hunger, lust, envy, 
commiseration, hope, hate will cer-
tainly push me to act, but I won’t be 
able to enter into any specific action 
until I can integrate my possible 
moves within the structure provided 
by a narrative or a story. From Aristo-
tle’s Poetics all the way to the 1970s’ 
structuralists, a story has been mini-
mally described as constituted by an 
initial state of affairs (a ‘beginning’) 
evolving (through a ‘middle part’) 
into an altered final state (the ‘end’). 
We constantly (although implicitly) 
refer to narrative structures in order 
to make sense of our experience. My 
current (provisionally final) situation 
makes sense insofar as I can see how 
it results from previous situations, 
along transformations that are due 
partly to my intentional moves, partly 
to chance encounters. I can only ‘act’ 
insofar as I imagine my future possible 
moves as operating transformations 
leading to a (provisionally) final state, 
which I want to reach or to avoid.
It is on this third narrative level 
that affects become integrated into 
explanations about the past, and into 
actions for the future. I feel thirst, I 
remember I have not drunk for a few 
hours, I can foresee that, if I manage 
to boil myself some water and throw 
some dried leaves in it, I will enjoy 
a nice cup of tea. I hear the govern-
ment is accumulating huge deficits, I 
have the experience of balancing my 
monthly budget, and I fear I will have 
to pay more taxes. I hear stories about 
factories closing down in Europe and 
companies outsourcing to China, 
and I feel anxiety about my job. I see 
reports of killings on the tv news, I 
see pictures of dark-skinned suspects, 
and I develop fear against immigrants 
from the South. 
The stories we hear generate 
affects, as much as they are needed to 
integrate our moves into future paths 
of action. As it was practically impos-
sible to separate the first ‘affective’ 
layer from the second ‘epidemic’ layer 
(since we mostly feel ‘in crowds’), 
similarly, it is practically impossible to 
separate the two ‘epidemic-affective’ 
layers from the third ‘narrative’ layer. 
In most of our experiences, we feel in 
and through stories. 
It is crucial, however, theoretically 
to distinguish this third level, because 
it introduces a much greater distance 
than the two previous levels between 
our actual conditions of living and 
the orientation of our life-experience. 
While the reality of my affects can 
never be denied, the connection is 
much looser between what really 
causes my affects, on one side, and, 
on the other how I account for them 
in my narrative of the past, and how 
I plan to act upon them in the future. 
Here again, we should presuppose the 
equality of intelligence: nobody nar-
rates his experience in totally extrava-
gant terms. Since most of us manage 
to live most of our lives outside of 
mental asylums, we do, in most of our 
moves, manage to connect fairly well 
(fairly efficiently, fairly ‘rationally’) 
to our actual conditions of living. It 
would therefore be fair to say that 
there is a good reason why people tell 
themselves (or each other) the stories 
they tell. And here again, we would 
be well inspired to give more credit 
to populist narratives: if they were 
totally disconnected from reality, peo-
ple would not buy them.
Yet, there are countless ways to 
narrate any experience. The framing, 
the editing, the wording of the narra-
tive are crucial to its meaning. And, 
as any literary scholar knows, apart 
from deceivingly simple and uninter-
esting cases, it is ludicrous to claim 
that one narrative is ‘more true’ than 
another: they can be both equally 
true, and yet lead the reader in sym-
metrically opposed directions. Was 
Antigone merely giving proper burial 
to her brother, in a private act of care? 
Or was she threatening the civil order, 
by not respecting Creon’s edict? Each 
character has his or her ‘good reasons’ 
to justify actions that nevertheless 
head for a violent clash.
 
Mythical Attractors
 
Since none of our lives follow an 
isolated course, since we feel ‘in num-
bers’, since, more often than not, 
‘our’ stories are recycled from stories 
we heard, read, watched, received 
from someone else, narratives – like 
affects – must be conceived on a col-
lective basis. They have their own 
existence outside of our individual 
subjectivity, they pass through us, 
temporarily inhabiting us, before 
moving on, in flows and in permanent 
metamorphoses. In other words, they 
have their own epidemiology, their 
own ‘opportunism’, like viruses and 
infections. 
At a fourth level, we must con-
sider the collective nature of stories 
as constituting political attractors. 
Independently of what Antigone her-
self (had she been a historical figure) 
could have experienced and narrated, 
her transformation from an obedient 
girl to a rebel has become a myth, a 
free-flying story which has managed 
to attract countless readers’ and view-
ers’ attention, providing them with 
a ready-made narrative structure. 
Among all the stories that we host (or 
sometimes generate), some feature the 
rare property of encapsulating and 
accounting for a whole block of rela-
tions defining a moment of our expe-
rience. Such narratives attract us – like 
a potential sexual partner attracts our 
gaze, like the light attracts the insect, 
like a pleasant melody catches our ear, 
or like a tasty dish pleases our palate. 
They make sense. 
Sociopolitical life has always been 
maddeningly complex: the geometry 
of collective affects is bound to thwart 
any computing capability. The only 
way to make (some) sense out of this 
chaos, today as yesterday, is to resort 
to myths. Rational calculation of our 
‘objective’ limitations and interests 
helps us make certain types of deci-
sions (for example, how many barrels 
of crude oil can be drawn, from which 
countries, for how long, at what 
price?). But even if we stick to physi-
cal data and predictions, the carpet is 
very soon pulled from under our feet 
(how much nuisance will be produced 
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in terms of greenhouse effects by the 
consumption of that amount of oil?). 
When human affects, tastes, decisions 
are brought into the picture, we have 
no choice but to resort to myths to 
understand our past, interpret our 
present and imagine our future. Like 
it or not, myths remain our best bet 
to orientate our 
development, by 
mobilizing the 
power of political 
attractors.4
 
Towards an Empowering Circulation 
of Myths 
 
We are now in a position to revisit the 
question-accusation of ‘populism’, and 
to understand more precisely where 
it is to be located within our four 
layers of political orientation. I will 
summarize my conclusions in four 
general theses, which I will use briefly 
to address some of the concrete issues 
most commonly associated with pop-
ulism. 
 
1. Populist discourses relay social 
pressures and tensions that are accu-
rately perceived (but insufficiently 
articulated) by large segments of the 
multitude. 
The common view expressed by tra-
ditional political analysts can be vali-
dated on at least one point: populism 
hijacks ‘real’ issues, to which it offers 
simplistic solutions, and for which 
more complex explanations need to 
be provided. 
Example: even if populist ‘tough-
on-crime’ policies are misled and mis-
leading, people are right to feel that 
their modes of life are increasingly 
under threat. It would only be half-
wise to remind them that no previous 
generation has led a more (materially) 
‘secure’ living than ours (in the rich 
Western countries): both the generat-
ing causes of ‘crime’ and its perception 
express the growing fragility of our 
individual forms of life. As we find 
ourselves increasingly interdepend-
ent, as our growing common power 
induces a growing awareness of our 
individual powerlessness, we (rightly) 
feel more ‘exposed’, and we are (logi-
cally) attracted to politics of fear. It 
is therefore accurate to portray pop-
ulism as providing bad solutions to 
real problems – and to call for a better 
(less simplistic) rearticulation of the 
(complex) issues at stake. 
 
2. It is not sufficient to attack populist 
myths with accurate facts and rational 
arguments: (reactionary) myths need 
to be overcome by (emancipatory) 
myths. 
Since human agency necessarily relies 
on narrative structures, and since 
political life necessarily relies on 
mythical attractors, those who are 
unhappy with populist mystifications 
should see it as their main task to sub-
stitute bad myths with better (more 
attractive) myths. 
Example: the anti-tax fanaticism 
on which countless populist move-
ments have ridden over the last 30 
years (from Margaret Thatcher to the 
current Tea Party) has been fuelled by 
countless stories of welfare queens, 
tax evaders, blood-sucked entrepre-
neurs and arrogant bureaucrats. Even 
if such stories are generally mythical 
and mystifying, ‘people’ are right, 
here again, to regard the cumbersome, 
sometimes obsolete and often oppres-
sive machinery of the state with the 
greatest suspicion. A vicious circle has 
simultaneously increased the services 
expected from public institutions, 
reduced their relative funding and, 
as a consequence, proven they were 
unable properly to do their job. 
Populist anti-state feelings need to 
be re-appropriated and reoriented by 
new myths expressing our growing 
need to develop common institutions 
capable of providing the high levels of 
care we have been led to expect. The 
perceived failure of the privatization 
of the British railroad system, the need 
for universal health care coverage in 
the USA, the call for an unconditional 
guaranteed income among European 
Greens, the demand for the enforce-
ment of environmental standards 
worldwide may all (partly) rely on 
myths: all the same, they all sketch 
stories paving the way for new modes 
of taxation, new promotions of com-
mon goods, new forms of collective 
agency – well beyond the bureaucratic 
structures of the existing (national) 
state. But we need myths to fight 
myths, if we are to reshape the politi-
cal agenda. 
 
3. In order to distinguish emancipa-
tory myths from reactionary ones, it is 
less important to measure how ‘mythi-
cal’ they are than to consider in which 
direction they push our collective 
development. 
If demagogical agendas need to be 
denounced, it is not because they 
rely on myths (simplifications, exag-
gerations, fictions), but because they 
mobilize bad myths, that is, politi-
cal attractors that promote policies 
resulting in a decrease of our col-
lective agency, either due to the sui-
cidal nature of their injunctions, or 
due to the injustice they impose on 
some of us. 
Example: even if the most vocal 
denunciations of populism tend to 
come from those who speak in the 
name of the ‘rational’ calculation of 
our best interests (orthodox econo-
mists and other expert engineers of 
market-based mechanisms), I would 
cite the hegemonic reference to gdp 
growth as a typical case of populism. 
For understandable reasons, we all 
want to have more means at our dis-
posal. Hence, we are fundamentally 
right to hope for an increase in our 
Gross Domestic Product. The prob-
lem with using gdp growth as the 
final word of any political argument 
is not that it is mythical in nature. Of 
course, it relies on a tale, on a fan-
tasy we tell ourselves (‘Accumulate 
more material means and you will be 
happier!’). 
The question, however, is not to 
decide how realistic or unrealistic 
this tale happens to be. gdp growth 
is the best example of what Bruno 
Latour calls a ‘factish’: the mixture 
of a fact (it is calculated by scientific 
procedures autonomous from our 
subjectivity) and a fetish (its effi-
ciency relies on the collective agency 
made possible by our believing in 
4. For more on this, see 
Yves Citton, Mythocratie. 
Storytelling et imaginaire 
de gauche (Paris: Éditions 
Amsterdam, 2010).
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it).5 The problem 
with the current 
hegemony of gdp 
growth is not that 
it refers to a myth, but that it acts 
more and more as a bad myth: its 
short-term bias pushes mankind in 
productivist and consumerist direc-
tions that threaten to ruin the very 
basis of our survival on this planet. 
It is demagogical insofar as it prom-
ises people to fill their pockets with 
wealth, while it simultaneously pulls 
the (environmental, social and men-
tal) rug from under their feet. 
 
4. Emancipatory myths best emerge 
from a media structure that favours 
a bottom-up circulation of myths, 
fuelled by a well-rounded circulation 
of information and knowledge. 
The elitist bias disqualifying the 
beliefs of the masses in the name of a 
superior rationality to be cultivated 
by decision-makers could easily be 
replaced by an equally elitist bias 
asking ‘intellectuals’ to provide the 
people with ‘good’ myths. Against 
such a temptation, it may be useful 
to remind ourselves of the collec-
tive nature of myths, which rarely 
emanate from individuals, but cir-
culate within a (sub) culture in a 
truly endemic fashion. Even if the 
determination of what constitutes a 
‘good’ or a ‘bad’ myth is bound to 
be conflictual, since the evaluation 
of the direction in which it pushes 
us presupposes the determination of 
goals and values which constitute the 
very stuff (and battleground) of poli-
tics, one could propose a structural 
criteria to evaluate the formation of 
(populist and demagogical) myths. 
Demagogy can be described as a 
top-down action, by which a (would-
be) leader mobilizes powerful media 
channels and networks – from the 
speaker’s place on the Greek agora 
to the primetime spot on the nightly 
tv news – in order to spread a myth 
within a population. By contrast, one 
could expect emancipating myths 
to emerge bottom-up from within a 
population, endemically. Unsurpris-
ingly, the most important and basic 
political struggle concerns the struc-
ture of the mediasphere: demagogy 
may be the inevitable companion of 
a highly centralized, highly vertical-
ized, highly monopolized structure 
(illustrated nowadays by Berlusconi’s 
Italy). Those who really want to fight 
demagogy would therefore be well-
inspired to do their best to promote 
a mediasphere in which myths can 
circulate bottom-up, from grassroots 
activists (right and left), coalescing 
from below into wider and wider 
movements. Obviously, the result of 
such a coalescence of myths will be a 
function of the quality of the informa-
tion and knowledge circulating at all 
levels of this mediasphere. 
Example: it is easy (and fashiona-
ble) to mock and discredit the promo-
tion of diversity, cultural hybridization 
and creolization as hollow and 
hypocritical injunctions (while equal-
ity would often be a more serious 
demand). Yet, in a historical moment 
when institutional suspicion, violent 
rejection and outright hate target so 
many (legal or illegal) immigrants, it is 
extremely important to do everything 
we can to favour the bottom-up com-
munication of stories among the vari-
ous sectors of our increasingly mixed 
populations. For one Roma rapist 
instantaneously portrayed on all of 
Berlusconi’s channels, how many 
un-broadcasted stories of humane 
gestures, personal assistance, fruitful 
collaborations, interdependence, soli-
darity, active resistance, community 
of fate uniting newcomers and past 
settlers? Creolization is no less a myth 
than ethnic purity, but it requires the 
invention of new (transversal) chan-
nels of communication in order to 
gather its attractive momentum. 
 
Outcome/Coming-Out
 
In the fall of 2008, as globally coor-
dinated national states were bend-
ing over and backwards to ‘save the 
banks’ (and global capitalism), reach-
ing deep in pockets that had previ-
ously been looted by the increasingly 
arrogant greed of the financial elite, 
we cruelly lacked a truly populist 
movement, which could have united 
the passionate rejections of financial 
deregulation, the affective denuncia-
tion of the outrageous profits made 
by traders and CEOs, and the ram-
pant disgust towards the profound 
absurdity of a system piling stress 
upon stress, and threat upon threat. 
As 2010 exacerbates old financial 
instabilities with new sociopolitical 
crises, Etienne Balibar has good rea-
sons to write: ‘We need something like 
a European populism, a simultaneous 
movement or a peaceful insurrection 
of popular masses who will be voic-
ing their anger as victims of the crisis 
against its authors and beneficiaries, 
and calling for 
a control “from 
below” over the 
secret bargaining 
and occult deals 
made by markets, 
banks, and States.’6 
Such a peaceful insurrection, if it 
is to take place, will certainly need us 
collectively to invent new channels of 
communication, to learn to listen and 
relay new stories, to activate and fuel 
new mythical attractors. The capital-
ist system is not ‘in’ crisis: it is a crisis. 
As such, it calls for an outcome – both 
a coming-out and an exit strategy. 
Populism (in its traditional right-wing 
as well as in its yet-to-be reinvented 
left-wing flavour) paves the way for 
something else to come out of capital-
ism. It is up to us to let it harden into 
a fascistic horror – or to help new 
emancipatory shapes emerge from its 
meltdown.
5. See Bruno Latour, Pan-
dora’s Hope: Essays on the 
Reality of Science Studies 
(Cambridge, MA/London: 
Harvard University Press, 
1999). 6. Etienne Balibar, ‘Europe: 
Final Crisis ?’, text pub-
lished on the Internet on 
22 May 2010. See also 
Balibar’s reflections on 
Laclau’s essay on populism 
‘Populisme et politique: le 
retour du contrat’, in: La 
proposition de l’égaliberté 
(Paris: PUF, 2010).
